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TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S.
TRANSNATIONAL LAW CONTROVERSY

Lorraine E. Weinrib*

I. INTRODUCTION

This Symposium celebrates the extraordinary career of Aharon Barak. In his
distinguished professional life, President Barak gave normative structure to many
elements of Israeli law, building upon the wisdom of his predecessors and drawing on his
encyclopaedic understanding of the doctrinal and adjudicative structures of civil and
common law systems as they pertain to private, public, and international law. 1 In his first
career as an academic and Dean of the Faculty of Law at Hebrew University, he
developed expertise in a wide range of legal subjects and mentored a generation of
Israeli lawyers, state officials, and judges.2 He distinguished himself as an astute and
principled Attorney General of Israel, whose commitment to the rule of law, the
independence of the judiciary, and the peace process was legendary. 3 During his twentyeight years on the Israeli Supreme Court, culminating in twelve years as its President, he
oversaw the maturation of many areas of Israeli law. Throughout these years of
illustrious public service, President Barak produced a veritable library of treatises,
monographs, essay collections, articles, and lectures. His accomplishments have attracted
world-wide acclaim, in great measure because of his remarkable engagement in
transnational legal study and analysis. 4
One of his most innovative contributions has been the development of a
jurisprudence of rights, which permeates Israeli private and criminal law, statutory
interpretation, as well as administrative and constitutional law. This project intensified
with the recent adoption of two rights-protecting Basic Laws, which moved Israel from
the odd situation of having "a constitution without a Constitution," to constitutional

* Faculty of Law, University of Toronto 1.weinrib a utoronto.ca.
1. See Emily Bazelon, Let There Be Law, LEGAL AFFAIRS, May-Jun, at 26 (2002).
2. See id. at 27.
3. See id.
4. See Tim Franks, Jerusalem Diary: Legal or Illegal, BBC NEwS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle-east/8443815.stm.
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protection of a range of human rights, including a right to the most expansive modern
constitutional principle - human dignity. 5 President Barak responded to this
"constitutional revolution" by delineating a sophisticated methodology for judicial
review of rights claims, including challenges to statutes.
In the United States, high praise for President Barak stands aside with severe
critique. 6 He has become entangled in the perennial debates on judicial activism and the
more recent controversy on the relevancy of transnational legal resources to adjudication
under the U.S. Constitution.7 Remarkably, Elana Kagan's warm introduction of
President Barak when Dean of the Harvard Law School was identified as a matter of
concern during the Judiciary Committee deliberations on her nomination to the U.S.
Supreme Court. 8
Barak's U.S. critics do not appreciate his distinctive jurisprudence or judicial
methodology. On the contrary, their criticism merely endorses their preferred positions
on U.S. constitutional law, theory, and practice generally as well as the debate on judicial
recourse to transnational legal resources. The weakness of their critique undermines its
objective - to protect the U.S. Constitution, as the fixed and petrified product of U.S.
history, from what they consider to be foreign taint.
This essay suggests that it is time to open up the originalist critique of judicial
activism, and the related debate of judicial recourse to transnational legal resources, to
transnational perspectives. The proponents of originalism have had many decades to
demonstrate the wisdom and institutional legitimacy of their position. Those who prefer
the conceptualization of a living constitution, despite their formulation of withering
criticisms of originalism, have not succeeded in establishing the superiority of their
paradigm. This failure may not reflect the merits of their claims as much as the difficulty
of mapping the parameters of the living constitution paradigm in response to its
reputation. Many scholars are now working to delineate this paradigm from first
principles in imaginative ways. 9 Their efforts would be clarified and strengthened by
expanding their intellectual horizons to include transnational legal resources.
The study of President Barak's approach to constitutional law and adjudication
provides an excellent first step on this journey, which should include study of other great
rights-protecting justices and sophisticated legal systems that endorse rights-based
democracy, the juridical embodiment of the post-World War II "rights revolution." They
need only look to other liberal democracies that have transitioned from majoritarian
democracy (or worse) to rights-based democracy both through formal constitutional
change and informal re-thinking of constitutional history, principles, text, and
interpretive methodologies. These legal systems regard democracy as a means to

5. See Zeev Segal, A Constitution Without A Constitution:Israeli Experience and the American Impact,
21 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1992).
6. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Praisefor an Israel Judge Drives Criticism of Kagan, N.Y. TIMES, (Jun. 24,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/us/politics/25kagan.html? r-1&pagewanted-print.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9.

JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM (2011), AKHIL R. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998),

and the authors mentioned in James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of the Newt
Textualism, 97 VA. L. REv. 1523 (2011) illustrate new approaches.
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achieve the highest aspirations of the modern constitutional state - the rule of law,
separation of powers, and respect for equal and inherent human dignity for all citizens,
for all persons affected by the state, and ultimately, for all humanity.
Opening the study of U.S. constitutional history and law to transnational
perspectives will produce an unexpected shock of recognition, because one of the most
impressive postwar efforts to transition to rights-based democracy was the great work of
the Warren Court. Domestically, a concerted political campaign promoting originalism
and states' rights repudiated the Warren Court but, from the transnational perspective,
the Warren Court's distinctive mode of adjudication did not fail. Its path-breaking
understanding of the foundational nature of rights protection within liberal democracy
has enjoyed an intense and flourishing afterlife on the transnational stage. This afterlife
has occurred in many different legal settings. One finds it in common law and civil law
systems. One also finds it in regional and international rights-protecting systems. It
adapts to constitutional systems based on one comprehensive document, a number of
separate instruments adopted at different times, an unwritten constitutional foundation
still based on legislative supremacy, and situations where rights protection is embodied
in a supra-national instrument. So too, it adapts to parliamentary and republican systems
and even constitutional monarchy.
This adaptability undermines
a number of propositions associated with
originalism: that rights protection is inconsistent with or a threat to democracy; that lawmaking power is vested exclusively in democratic institutions as representative and
accountable, without scrutiny as to the quality of representation and accountability that
rights-protection provides; that judicial review lacks legitimacy because of the special
education, experience, and social status of members of the judiciary; that the judicial role
usurps the legislative and constituent powers when it departs from strict readings of
constitutional history and text to derive concrete, petrified, socially conservative
meaning; and that judicial review attentive to transnational legal resources involves (i)
rejection of all that is nationally distinctive or textually directed and/or (ii) selection of
comparative sources that either endorse personal and political preferences or adopt
progressive social trends.
This essay has five parts. Part II examines the constitutional paradigms that frames
the current U.S. debate on judicial activism and judicial recourse to transnational legal
materials. Part III analyzes three assessments of President Barak's work by leading U.S.
commentators in the light of these paradigms, to demonstrate that the strong desire to
brand him an activist undermines, distorts, and obscures legal analysis generally and the
debate on transnational law specifically. Part IV presents what Barak's critics have
labored to obscure: his sophisticated understanding of constitutional law and
adjudication in respect to rights protection. Part V delineates the larger dimensions of
post-WWII constitutional thought, to which President Barak has made an invaluable
contribution. Part VI concludes by inviting transnational study as a means to deeper
understanding of U.S. constitutional theory, history, and institutional roles generally and
the current debates on transnational legal resources in particular.
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11. CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGMS AND THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW DEBATE

Two opposing constitutional paradigms animate the controversy over judicial
consideration of transnational legal resources in the United States. The originalists
repudiate reference to modern transnational legal material, which includes the
constitutional law of other democracies as well as international human rights law. 10 The
most vociferous objections arise in cases involving rights claims, especially challenges to
law or state action embodying faith-based and conservative social morality. In contrast,
the adherents of a living, rights-based constitutional order are open to consideration of
modern transnational legal sources for limited purposes such as taking express notice of
established trends in rights-protection in other liberal democracies and under
international rights-protecting systems thought to share the same fundamental
principles.12 They consider transnational legal material to be illuminating, but neither
authoritative nor persuasive in the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.
The originalists' rejection of contemporary transnational material reflects their
understanding of the U.S. Constitution as law, written and ratified by political actors to
establish new institutions and precise rules for the exercise of public power. 13 The text is
not merely supreme, positive, and highly particularized. It is also denotes historically
fixed meaning.
The judicial role that follows from these precepts is narrowly exegetical - to
exhume the particular, fixed meaning of the words in the constitutional text through
examination of contemporaneous dictionaries, legal sources, and commentaries.
Separation of powers, democracy, self-governance, and federalism are invoked to
legitimate this narrow judicial function.
Originalists reject judicial reading of the text to extrapolate abstract or normative
directives. Such an approach imposes elite, personal or political preferences and in effect
usurps the representative and accountable state legislatures' authority to make law. In the
extreme, it arrogates the constituent power to amend the Constitution contrary to the
special institutional requirements designated for this purpose. The Constitution has a
conservative function according to this account: it preserves traditional social values and
faith-based precepts about the good life for the sake of the community. Change comes, if
at all, as the product of electoral and legislative politics at the state level. This historical
orientation emphasizes the authority of precedent.
Members of the American judiciary and academics who subscribe to this
originalist paradigm reject recourse to transnational legal material. Familiarity with
constitutional principles, institutional roles, and adjudicative methodologies in other
rights-protecting systems unconnected to the ideas that animated the formulation and

10. See generally Jamal Greene, On the Originsof Originalism, 88 TEx. L. REv. 1 (2009).
11. See id. at 7-8.
12. See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 549
(2009); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 329 (2004); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "A Decent Respect
to the Opinions of [Humanikind": The Value of a Comparative Perspective in ConstitutionalAdjudication,
64(3) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 575 (2005).

13. See Greene, supranote 10.
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adoption of the constitutional text is alien, foreign, and illegitimate to the interpretation
of the U.S. constitutional text. The idea of learning from the writing or judgments of a
foreign judge, even one as eminent as President Barak, is inconceivable.
Standing opposed to this historical-textual, originalist approach are the living
constitutionalists. They too approach the Constitution as supreme law that reflects
commitment to the separation of powers, democracy, self-governance, and federalism.
They also hold the highest respect for the constitutional text and its historical genesis.
They do not agree that these shared presuppositions direct the judiciary to exhume a
fixed, specific, historically demonstrated meaning from the constitutional text, however.
In line with the leading historical experts, they question the authenticity of the specific
historical meaning originalists deem necessary to resolve constitutional cases; they also
question the judicial methodology for discerning such meaning; more generally, they
reject efforts to use history to bind later generations living in circumstances and with
experience and knowledge unimaginable in the moment of constitutional drafting,
ratification, and popular debate.
Living constitutionalists do not consider the adversary process the proper forum to
vindicate the historical or intended meaning of the Constitution to then apply to issues of
a different era and sensibility, they deny the mutually exclusive possibilities that the
originalists offer as between originalism and unrestrained subjectivism. On the contrary,
they consider the judiciary duty-bound to read the full Constitution, as amended,
holistically - as a coherent, comprehensive embodiment of abstract, normative, and
organic meaning. The text stands as a codification of enduring fundamental principles. It
embodies a social contract secured over time by institutions responsible to the people as
a whole and as individuals. The judiciary has the special responsibility to extrapolate and
apply these principles, as binding law, to ensure their continuity within an ever changing
polity.
Within this paradigm, the Constitution does not freeze the faith-based or social
ordering of the founding generation. Rather, it reflects a mix of sources developed over
time, including the ideas that animated and legitimated the Revolution, the Declaration
of Independence, the fundamental rights of British subjects under the unwritten British
constitution, and the emerging understanding of the relationship between the free
individual and the state delineated by Enlightenment theorists. Constitutional
adjudication creates the platform for working out the full meaning of these various
understandings.
While the text originally extended these rights restrictively, to the national level
and to certain classes of persons, later amendments revised this worldview. Many
judgments erroneously preserved social practices considered to be constitutionally
protected or even paramount to constitutional directives; however, living
constitutionalists do not consider such rulings binding. They are committed to bringing
judge-made constitutional law into conformity with the constitution's fundamental
principles as revealed in the life of the nation.14
14. Striking U.S. examples include the progression from Dred Scott to Plessy to Brown, and from Bowers
to Lawrence v. Texas. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
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Adherents to this paradigm are open to learning about other constitutional systems
based upon the same or similar fundamental principles and institutional roles. This
interest extends to the theories and practices of leading justices of other Supreme and
Constitutional Courts, including the bodies that adjudicate upon regional and
international human rights questions. It follows that they would be genuinely interested
in the work of a masterful judge like President Barak, since they recognize
commonalities between his account of constitutional principles, institutional roles, and
adjudicative methodologies and their understanding of their own constitutional
arrangements.
It is now many decades since the originalists succeeded in a concerted campaign to
denigrate the work of the Warren Court. 15 They castigated its judges for invoking the
living constitution paradigm, which supposedly empowered an elite judiciary to change
the Constitution by reading into its text their personal and political preferences, in effect
arrogating political, legislative, and constituent prerogatives. They dismissed the
judgments of the Warren Court as departing from acceptable modes of interpretation and
lacking methodology. More particularly, the originalists ridiculed judicial references to
the core, penumbra, and emanations of the text, invoked to express the understanding of
the Constitution as the coherent, comprehensive codification of abstract, normative, and
organic meaning. Similarly, they ridiculed language that expressed reverence for
individual liberty and equal, inherent human dignity.16 They expressed particular
consternation at judicial opinions that undermined traditional social roles and faith-based
public policy.
Their campaign gathered support from those who found the Warren Court's rulings
too innovative, inconsistent with their own values and moral commitments, or tilted
against state power. The Reagan Justice Department gave strong support to this cause.17
The Republican Party embraced the originalist critique of judicial activism as its
template when the Senate Judiciary Committee appraised nominees for appointment to
the Supreme Court; indeed some of these appointments went to the lawyers who had led
the original originalist initiative. 18
The living constitutionalists had no corresponding organized political leadership,
institutional home or public resources. The beneficiaries of the Warren Court's
innovative jurisprudence were individuals and groups who had limited resources, fewer
connections in high places, and burdened lives. That was the point: they sought judicial
rulings against the legislative and executive branches, which had entrenched political,
legal, and constitutional positions that undermined their political standing and full
personhood. Moreover, the roots of the Warren Court's approach to constitutional
history, theory, institutional role, and judicial methodology lay in a constitutional
paradigm that had not yet come to full maturity.

(1986); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
15. Jarnal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L. J. 657 (2009).
16. See Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). See also Griswold v. Connecticut,

381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. See Greene, supranote 10, at 86.
18. Id.
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The intervening decades have provided new perspectives for analyzing the
originalist theory, methodology, and analysis. One of these perspectives is domestic. The
originalists have expanded their perspective a number of times - from original intent of
the drafters, to original understanding of the ratifiers to contemporaneous public
meaning. 19 These realignments responded to historical research, legal critique, and
ideology. They offer no response to the foundational challenge, however: that
originalism was not originally intended. They have refrained from applying their
methodology to the full constitutional text without explanation. They cling to precedent
selectively, standing firm in the face of research that discredits the historical-textual
methodology that they champion when the substantive issues are ideologically sensitive,
but forge ahead to novel ideological rulings when the opportunity materializes.20 They
restrict judicial review in the name of democracy, but their rulings on democratic
processes seem as open-ended as their critique of the Warren Court.21 To reach desired
results, they have gone so far as to privilege dictionary definitions over syntax.22 All
told, they have failed to deliver the objectivity and methodological rigor they tout as
necessary to legitimate the judicial role.
The second new perspective offered by the intervening decades is to be found in
transnational legal resources, which shine a new light on the distinctive innovations in
legal analysis forged by the Warren Court. Transnational study reveals similar
innovations in the sophisticated judicial methodology developed in many leading
constitutional democracies to protect fundamental rights and freedoms in the aftermath
of the Second World War.23 More generally, it reveals the vital role of the model of
living constitutionalism in framing the foundation of the modern constitutional state,
based on deeply rooted understandings of the freedom of the individual and respect for
equal and inherent human dignity.
The next section of this paper examines a particular example of the remarkably
vociferous originalist polemic against judicial recourse to transnational legal resources in
the United States - the assessment of President Barak's legal thinking by two leading
U.S. public opinion leaders, Robert Bork and Richard Posner. It then contrasts these
critiques with a very positive assessment of President Barak's constitutional
methodology by a leading scholar of both the Warren Court and the living constitution

19. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution s Secret Drafting
History, 91 GEO. L. J. 1113, 1124-47 (2003).
20. See Laivrence, 539 U.S. 558; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
21. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 50
(2010).
22. In Heller, 554 U.S. 570, the majority ignored the relevant syntax in order to bifurcate the clauses of the
Second Amendment. The appropriate grammatical structure is the Latin ablative absolute, which would have
been well-known to educated men in the founding era and therefore correct for an approach based on public
meaning. The Second Amendment, read within this structure, integrates the meaning of the two clauses so that
the right to bear arms is connected to the need for a militia.
23. Canada and South Africa offer interesting examples of intensified rights protection without formal
change in the postwar period. See Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Supreme Court of Canadain the Age of Rights, 79
CAN. BAR REV., (vol 2) 699 (2000) (postwar judicial recognition of an "implied bill of rights" in Canadian
constitutional law); Lorraine E. Weinrib, Sustaining Constitutional Values: the Schreiner Legacy, 14 S AFR. J.
ON HUm. RTs. 352 (1998) (postwar judicial resistance to legislative removal of voting rights of coloured
minority, subordinating legislative supremacy to fundamental rights).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2011

7

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 47 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 7
386

TULSA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47:2

paradigm, Owen Fiss.
III. U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGMS, TRANSNATIONALISM AND PRESIDENT
BARAK

How do we understand the fact that President Barak has become a polarizing
figure in the U.S. debate on judicial activism and transnational law? Robert Bork and
Richard Posner label him a judicial activist who exemplifies the dangers of recourse to
transnational legal resources in the adjudication of U.S. cases. Owen Fiss, in contrast,
analyzes the methodology in a few of Barak's path-breaking cases on anti-terrorism and
compares it favorably to comparable U.S. cases. Without engaging in the debate on
transnational legal sources, he demonstrates the power of comparative analysis to
illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of judicial reasoning particularly in regard to the
protection of fundamental rights.
Robert Bork begins his review of Barak's monograph, The Judge in a Democracy,
by expressing regret for the extensive influence that such an activist judge has had on
law in Israel and internationally. Such judicial activism undermines the law-making
function of democratic institutions because it does not constrain the judiciary to legal
rules beyond its creation. Barak exemplifies this failing in that he "reaches results or
announces principles that cannot plausibly be derived from the constitution he cites"
rather than applying "the principles of the constitution as they were understood by the
men who made the constitution law." 2 4
This critique embodies certain presuppositions. It either assumes that all
constitutional law is based on a comprehensive written instrument that embodies original
intent, an untenable premise, or, at least, requires examination of the constitutional
arrangements in which a particular judge does his work. But Bork pays scant attention to
the limited formally written elements of the Israeli constitutional system, much of which
- as is common in the British model - is judge made. His description of Israeli cases is
both superficial and inaccurate, as if taken from secondary accounts by others who share
his political views, even though most of the cases to which he adverts are available in
English translation. 25
One would expect a leading U.S. jurist to know more about the variety of
constitutional arrangements in the democratic world. Moreover, one would also expect
careful study of the particular legal context and the larger comparative context before
condemnation of a foreign judge for having set a "world record for judicial hubris" in
deciding cases in a manner that is "ludicrous," "officious," or even "dangerous". 2 6
Bork suggests that the two relatively recent rights-protecting Basic Laws, which

24. Robert H. Bork, Barak's Rule, AZURE, 125 (Winter 2007) (reviewing AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN
A DEMOCRACY (2006)).

25. Id. at 127 (He refers here, and in his book, to Evelyn Gordon, an Israeli journalist who shares his
political views. She was a reporter for the Jerusalem Post from 1990-97, reporting on the Supreme Court and
the Knesset as well as other issues, and then wrote a regular column from 1998-2009. She has published
articles in the Israeli quarterly Azure, in which the Bork article appears, as well as Commentary where she is
currently a blogger. See ROBERT BORK, COERCING VIRTUE 103-06 (2002)).

26. Bork, supra note 24, at 130-31.
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the Israeli Supreme Court affirmed as constitutional instruments authorizing judicial
review of statutes, do not have this status or effect because their adoption lacked a
constitutional ratification process and only 25% of Knesset members approved them. 27
The insistence upon ratification is odd since numerous national constitutional
instruments do not have the imprimatur of ratification. It is even more strange to insist
upon ratification in Israel, where the elected legislature exercises the constituent power
when it enacts Basic Laws.
Moreover, the Knesset, in its constituent capacity, passed these Basic Laws a
second time, with strong endorsement, adding amendments that strengthened and
expanded their normative prescriptions and affirmed the mandate for judicial review of
executive action and statute.28 The most important point is that these Basic Laws do not
give the judiciary the last word. One contains a legislative override. Both are easily
amended by the Knesset. Also relevant is the fact that the cases that Bork cites to
illustrate Barak's judicial activism are predominantly cases of review of executive
action, not statute. The few instances where the Supreme Court has invalidated
legislative provisions have not precipitated amendment of the Basic Laws.
Bork cites two American Supreme Court cases that he considers as activist as the
ones that Barak has decided - Roe v. Wade and Lawrence v. Texas, both cases
involving invalidation of statute and "moral" issues. 29 He characterizes these cases as
instances where the U.S. Supreme Court rewrote the Constitution by introducing new
principles to trump laws that the U.S. federal arrangements allocate to state
legislatures. 30 He cites Lawrence as an exceptionally egregious example of judicial

27. Id. at 127. Bork's reference is to the first vote on these laws in 1992. In 1994 they were passed again
with amendments on a vote of 67 to 9, with no abstentions. The Knesset, Israel's national parliament, has 120
members and no quorum for passing legislation. Many laws are passed with only 20-30 Members of Knesset
present. The Basic Law, Freedom of Occupation, i.e., vocation, stipulates that its amendment requires an
absolute majority of the Knesset: s. 7 reads: "This Basic Law shall not be varied except by a Basic Law passed
by a majority of the members of the Knesset." I am indebted to Hillel Sommer for providing me with the
details of the second vote. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty stipulates no special rule for its amendment,
so the no quorum, majority vote would apply.
28. Id. Israeli courts have long protected basic rights by applying strong presumptions within private law,
statutory interpretation and administrative law. The two rights-protecting Basic Laws were designed to extend
this protection as against statute. Their final texts protected only selected rights, after a prolonged debate in
civil society, legislative deliberations and work in the Ministry of Justice that initially contemplated judicial
review of statute under a comprehensive bill of rights. Important rights were not included in the final texts, e.g.,
the freedoms of expression and religion, and equality, due to concern as to the extensive change that judicial
review of statute on this basis would generate. The Basic Laws stipulate the extent to which they apply to prior
enacted statute, later enacted statute, and any special rules for their amendment by the Knesset. Both Basic
Laws stipulate the grounds for the justified limitation of these rights by law, meaning statute and subordinate
statute. In addition, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, i.e., vocation, provides a temporary legislative
override by which the Knesset can subordinate the guaranteed right to specific legislation. When the override
ends, the legislation itself terminates. The limitation and override formulations were modeled on the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, which applies to statute. It is difficult, given these considerations, to
take the view that judicial review of statute is not a primary element of the institutional design of these Basic
Laws. Those who invoke originalism to the contrary do not invoke the subjective or objective intent or
understanding of Israeli parliamentarians, or the informed or engaged public. They seem to depend upon
misguided, inadvertent or feigned ignorance of the law reform project that ushered in these new Basic Laws. If
so, they provide an example of inappropriate comparative influence, in mistaking the particularistic views of
U.S. politicians and commentators who reject the legitimacy of judicial review of statute, based on original
intent or understanding within U.S. constitutional history, as inconsistent with democratic governance at large.
29. Bork, supra note 24, at 127-28.
30. Id. at 126.
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activism because newly appointed judges overturned a prior ruling, which effectuated a
change in the meaning of the Constitution itself.3 1
Regrettably, Bork does not specify the parallels he sees between the U.S. Supreme
Court cases and the Israeli ones he cites. His observation that activist judges "have
enlisted on the 'elite' side of the transnational culture war" suggests that he projects the
U.S. culture war onto the transnational stage, just as he projects on Israel the need for a
fully written, particularist, historically frozen constitutional text, legitimated by
ratification, subject to procedures for constitutional amendment different from the
ordinary procedure for legislation. The Israeli cases he considers do not relate to the
subject matter that falls within the U.S. culture war rubric, although there are Israeli
cases decided by President Barak that do contain this content. In addition, he does not
mention the cases that raise intense cultural concerns within the Israeli context.
Bork's views of Barak are not limited to the world of book review readers. He saw
fit to invoke his ill-informed critique on the political stage when he intervened in the
public debate on the nomination of Elana Kagan to the U.S. Supreme Court.32 His
concern was her decanal introduction of President Barak, in an award ceremony at the
Harvard Law School, as her "judicial hero," "the judge or justice in my lifetime whom
[sic], I think, best represents and has best advanced the values of democracy and human
rights, of the rule of law and of justice." 33 Bork countered that Barak "may be the worst
judge on the planet, the most activist" and condemned Kagan's praise for him as
"disqualifying in and of itself."34 Kagan countered by indicating her remarks were
directed at Barak's contribution to the development of Israeli law.
Richard Posner's assessment of President Barak is more thoughtful, but just as
critical. While he describes Barak as a likely recipient of a Nobel Prize in law, if there
were one, and acknowledges his reputation for brilliance, he assesses Barak's The Judge
in a Democracy as sufficient reason for American judges to refrain from citing foreign
judgments. 3 5 The main reason for this aversion is that Barak's thinking is so "weirdly
different" from his own.
Barak must be condemned because his view of democracy mandates the
enforcement of particular rights and does not adhere to the strictures of originalist
interpretation.36 Posner is especially displeased at Barak's use of abstract concepts such
as interpretation, separation of powers, objectivity, equality, and reasonableness, which
he dismisses as the "empty verbiage" and "plays on words" that activist judges typically
invoke to usurp the legislature's law-making power.37 He accounts for Barak's perceived
excesses biographically - he is to be regarded as the "prisoner of his experiences,"
which he reduces to his childhood suffering in Lithuania during the Holocaust, ignoring

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 126-27.
See Stolberg, supra note 6.
Id.
Id

35. RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 362-63 (2008) [hereinafter How JUDGES THINK]; Richard A.
Posner,
Enlightened
Despot,
THE
NEW
REPUBLIC,
(Apr.
23,
2007),
http://www.tnr.com/print/article/enlightened-despot [hereinafter Enlightened Despot].
36. How JUDGES THINK, supranote 35, at 363-64.

37. Id. at 367; EnlightenedDespot, supra note 33.
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his major role in building the legal system and judicial function in one of the most
challenged and successful post-WWII democracies.38
Like Bork, Posner characterizes the legitimate judicial role as originalist, both at
home and abroad. He has not studied other constitutional systems sufficiently to realize
that it would be quite difficult to determine what originalism might mean within the
Israeli legal system, which is based on a long list of national peculiarities, including
distinctive history (nationhood after systemic discrimination against the Jewish minority
in the Christian world and, to a lesser extent, in the Muslim world; the extreme
deprivations and atrocities suffered by the Jewish people in Europe before and during
World War II); a combination of unwritten and written constitutional resources as well as
a step-by-step constitutional drafting process; multiple sources of law including Jewish,
Ottoman and British law; proportional representation with a very low threshold for party
status that produces a close to dysfunctional coalition system; fundamentalist religious
political parties as well as parties hostile to the state itself; a population largely made up
of refugees from non-democratic polities with traumatic experiences and/or no
experience in democratic governance; constant vigilance against terrorism within and
beyond national borders; and recurrent military engagements between frequent wars. He
seems unaware of the problem of applying originalism to states that have deep historical
roots, rather than definitive breaks from those roots precipitating the entrenchment of a
formal, comprehensive written constitutional instrument.
Like Bork, Posner takes no interest in the Supreme Court of Israsel's sophisticated
reading of the legal instruments that Israel considers constitutional - instruments that
are filled with references to the norms and abstractions that he derides as "empty
verbiage" and "plays on words." 39 He dismisses the idea, so integral to Barak's juridical
universe, that statutory and constitutional interpretation entails harmonizing the
principles of the legal system as a whole with the curt statement, without any indication
of its foundation, that "no real legal system has a unitary spirit or common set of
values." 40 In reference to the converging trends in rights adjudication in liberal
democracies in the aftermath of World War II, he stipulates that "[t]he problem is not
learning from abroad; it is treating foreign judicial decisions as authorities in U.S. cases,
as if the world were a single legal community . . ."41
It is not clear what Posner means when he acknowledges the possibility of learning
from abroad. His explicit denial of authoritative status is not helpful, since he would be
hard pressed to find anyone in the living constitutionalist camp, anywhere, who would
disagree. This position seems to be a figment of the originalist imagination. He
acknowledges that transnational law may offer strong or persuasive reasoning, but, again
like Bork and other originalists, he is not interested in legal reasoning. He therefore does
not examine the complex methodology that Barak applies to move from abstract
principle, to doctrine, to the rulings that he finds so otiose. Also, following Bork, Posner

38. How JUDGES THINK, supranote 35, at 368.
39. How JUDGES THINK, supranote 35, at 367; EnlightenedDespot, supra note 33.
40. Enlightened Despot, supra note 35.
41. Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws,
http://www.legalaffairs.org /printerfriendly.msp?id=589 (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
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jumps to cases on "moral" issues, namely abortion and same-sex marriage, as the prime
U.S. examples of unacceptable activism, i.e., judicial imposition of personal moral or
social preferences in lieu of respecting the law-making authority of legislatures. 42No
link between this culture war inspired originalism and Barak's work is provided.
Posner, like Bork, premises his claims on mistaken views of the Israeli legal
system. He states that Israel does not have a constitution, on the assumption that only the
U.S. constitutional model passes muster. He thus dismisses the instruments and
principles considered constitutional within the British model of constitutional law, so
important to the U.S. framers' thinking. 43 He asserts that Barak elevated the Basic Laws
to constitutional status by "holding that the Knesset cannot repeal them," ignoring the
fact that Barak has always acknowledged, as he must, that they fall under the rules of
amendment that the Knesset has stipulated. 44 He labels Barak's account of constitutional
adjudication as "weird," and warns Americans against the influence of adjudication in
other democracies on the assumption of shared democratic principles. 4 5 He seems
unaware that his insistence upon positivist, originalist constitutional interpretation has
been expressly rejected by the full range of modern constitutional democracies on the
basis of their shared principles, especially the commitment to rights-based democracy.
Owen Fiss presents a strikingly different approach to President Barak's mode of
adjudication. He prefaces his comparison of the judicial review of challenges to actions
taken in the "war against terrorism" in the U.S. and Israeli Supreme Courts by setting out
the basic parameters of his approach to U.S. constitutional law.46 Unlike Bork and
Posner, he aligns himself with the living constitution paradigm by stipulating that the
meaning of the Constitution is not circumscribed by the words set down in 1787 and the
twenty-seven amendments adopted thereafter. 47 Rather, he advocates reading the
Constitution as a set of principles embedded in the framers' words, in various enactments
that further expound those principles, and in structural elements of governance.48 These
principles include the separation of powers and basic fundamental rights and liberties
such as the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the people's right to
speak freely unless the government has established lawful grounds for surveillance. 49
While Bork also refers to principles in his test for activism, he advocates judicial
subservience to originalist readings of the constitutional text and deference to the
function and product of majoritarian institutions, leaving little or no space for
fundamental principles.
Fiss's basic premise is that constitutional principles must prevail in times of peace
and in times of war. 50 He objects to the tendency to accede to a reduced level of judicial

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Enlightened Despot, supra note 35.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 27.
Enlightened Despot, supra note 35.
Owen Fiss, Law, is Everyiihere, 117 YALE L.J. 256, 257 (2007).
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id. at 261-62.
Id. at 259.
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protection of these principles in the context of perceived emergency conditions. 5 1
Indeed, Fiss contends that these principles are just as important in times of stress;
deference in times of emergency might precipitate a permanent reduction in protection.52
Fiss therefore respects President Barak's steadfast commitment to judicial review
of constitutional principles in times of national danger and stress. His close reading of
the relevant case law leads him to a clear conclusion - that the Israeli Supreme Court
under Barak's leadership safeguarded basic civil liberties to a greater extent than the
Supreme Court of the United States, even though Israel faces equal or greater dangers to
national security. 53 He does not consider Barak's approach "weird," an engagement in
the transnational culture war, or driven by his childhood experiences during the
Holocaust. 54
Fiss does not ignore the distinctive history, principles, and institutional structure of
the Israeli legal system or assume any similarity to U.S. constitutional law in substantive
or institutional terms. He notes correctly that the Israeli judiciary is directed by a
combination of unwritten principles and a series of Basic Laws, largely treated as having
constitutional status by the Israeli Supreme Court within the parameters of legislative
supremacy. 55 He acknowledges the long-term plan to entrench all the Basic Laws into
one instrument with the status of supreme law, subject to a special amending
procedure. 56
Having evaluated Barak's judgments within the actual framework of the Israeli
constitutional system, Fiss does not detect an illegitimate usurpation of legislative or
constituent prerogatives. 57 He characterizes Barak's approach as faithful to the
constitutional principles embedded in the aspirations set out in the Declaration of
Independence of Israel, customary international law, and the understanding of
democratic governance as the institutionalization of these abstract constitutional
principles. Moreover, Fiss characterizes Barak's analytic methodology as an exercise in
rationality. 58
Fiss is well known for the view that the quality of legal analysis and its supporting
material legitimate the adversary process. On this basis, he analyzes Barak's adjudicative
methodology carefully. He notes that each judgment begins with an account of the
particular constitutional values raised in the litigation, the basic rights under analysis in
the light of those values, and the analytic tools necessary to reconcile contentious factual

51. Fiss, supranote 46, at 259-60.
52. Id. at 275. Note that the two new rights-protecting Basic Laws are not automatically displaced by
emergency regulations. See Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, s. 6 ("This Basic Law shall not be varied,
suspended or made subject to conditions by emergency regulations"). Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,
s. 12, makes the same stipulation and then sets out that a declaration under s. 9 of the Law and Administration
Ordinance permits the enactment of emergency regulations to deny or restrict stipulated rights if the denial or
restriction is for a proper purpose and for a period and extent no greater than is required. This type of provision,
which contemplates judicial review, is similar to emergency clauses in other post WWII constitutions and in
statute law.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 271-72.
55. Id. at 271-72.
56. Id..
57. Id.
58. Id. at 277.
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and legal claims. 59 This approach, he observes, cautions against peremptory institutional
deference. 60
Fiss offers close analysis of one case, in which Barak considered Palestinian
challenges to the placement of the security wall within the Occupied Territories on the
ground that it interfered with the most basic elements of day to day life, including access
to agricultural lands, family, medical care, education, shopping, and religious activities,
among other things. 6 1 Barak acknowledges that the route stipulated by the military
officials warrants respect because it was based on the specific professional expertise of
govermnent experts and legitimated by the political responsibility that the military must
take for all of its decisions.62 This respect does not trigger judicial deference, however.
The judiciary has its own legal expertise to apply. In addition, the judiciary operates
under its own distinct responsibility - the duty to scrutinize impugned law and state
action on standards of rationality, in both instrumental and substantive terms whenever
fundamental values are implicated, regardless of the high political importance or
sensitivity of the constitutional question under review. 63
Scrutiny of instrumental rationality entails two steps. The first is to evaluate the
connection between means and ends.64 The second is to evaluate whether the impugned
law or state action impairs the right as minimally as possible.65 Fiss notes that this type
of rationality review is similar to the analysis by U.S. judges under the rubric of strict
scrutiny analysis, but then points out a striking difference: whereas the U.S. Supreme
Court applies this level of scrutiny "only intermittently, and hardly ever in the context of
war," the Israeli Supreme Court applies these factors consistently wherever fundamental
values are implicated.66
U.S. constitutional analysis has no parallel for the final stage of proportionality
analysis - the consideration of substantive rationality.67 Fiss pinpoints the crucial
significance of this consideration by citing the high burden of justification imposed on
the state to establish that the breach of the constitutionally protected fundamental interest
is proportionate to the benefit anticipated from the infringing statute or state action.68
This final stage justification is pivotal in the case under examination since the state
satisfied the two instrumental rationality standards - first, that the military's preferred
route was rationally connected to the level of security considered necessary and, second,
that this route impaired the rights of the Palestinians minimally given that benchmark
level of security.
Barak assesses the arguments and supporting factual and expert material submitted
59. Id. at 274, 276.
60. Id. at 275-76.
61. Id. at 274-75. See HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004], available at http://www.
icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/39a82e2ca42b52974125673e00508144/09d47365bd007706c12575c20046ec2a!OpenDo
cument.
62. Fiss, supranote 46, at 275.
63. Id. at 275-76.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 277.
66. Id. at 276-77 (citing Korernatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
67. Id. at 277.
68. Id.
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to the Court to ascertain both the benefit sought and the harm precipitated by the
impugned state action. In concluding that the harm imposed on Palestinian communities
by the military's designated route exceeded the additional security protection projected
for the Israeli populace, Barak ruled that the state had not justified its position.69
Accordingly, the government would have to alter the route of the wall, at great cost and
at the risk of a reduced level of security.
Fiss respects this methodology as a rigorous, legitimate mode of judicial scrutiny
of the adequacy of rights protection, despite the high political and military significance
of the powers under review. He describes it as "the embodiment of reason in the service
of humanity," i.e., respect for human dignity.70 In addition, Fiss characterizes Barak as a
"modern day apostle of the Enlightenment" for actualizing the enjoyment of rights so
effectively. He considers this achievement all the more remarkable given the geopolitical
context in which Israelis live, which is saturated in violence and religious passions. 7 1
These contrasting assessments of Barak's approach to constitutional rights
adjudication under the Israeli constitutional framework reflect deep-rooted disagreement
on the most basic understandings of U.S. constitutional history, text, institutions and
practice. These assessments reveal more about the strengths and weaknesses of these
competing paradigms than they do about Barak's adjudicative methodology, Israeli
constitutionalism, or the merits of transnational legal discourse. In particular, they
demonstrate that the originalists' hyper-positivistic, socially conservative polemic leaves
no room for judicial consideration of normative constitutional principles relating to rights
protection.
The originalist school has precipitated a flight from legal reasoning so extensive
that leading adherents treat transnational study as a threat to their preferred polemic
within domestic constitutional debate. Fiss, in contrast, is open to analyzing the Israeli
constitutional system sufficiently to recognize that the precepts of the living constitution
model thrive within it,72 notably in the anti-terrorism context, one of the best tests of the
strength of constitutional principles, the separation of powers and the independence of
the judiciary.73 Departing from the defensiveness of Bork and Posner, Fiss does not
make any claim about the propriety of recourse to transnational legal materials by the
U.S. judiciary.7 4 Rather, his analysis and conclusions demonstrate the high value of such
expertise on academic understanding of modern constitutional thought and practice,
including the thought and practice of the legal system that is the most difficult to
understand - one's own. 75
The next section of this paper takes a more detailed look at President Barak's
constitutional universe. It suggests the enrichment that the study of transnational law

69. Fiss, supranote 46, at 277-78. See HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004], available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/39a82e2ca42b52974125673e00508144/09d47365bd007706cl2575c20046ec2a
!OpenDocument.
70. Fiss, supranote 46, at 278.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 259, 271-73.
73. Id. at 260-70.
74. Id. at 271-74.
75. Id. at 277.
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offers, with particular focus on the clarity it brings to analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of the originalist paradigm and its repudiation of transnational legal sources
within U.S. adjudication.
IV. PRESIDENT BARAK'S APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONALISM

President Barak's remarkable contribution to Israeli constitutional law and to the
theory of constitutional rights protection is infused with his extensive expertise in
comparative law. As a student at Hebrew University, he was taught by a faculty that
included many Jewish 6migr6s from sophisticated legal systems, including both common
law and civil law systems. While a law professor and then Dean of the Hebrew
University Faculty of Law, and later as a justice on the Supreme Court for almost three
decades, he dedicated himself to the development of Israeli law, including private and
corporate law. He was actively engaged over the years in the codification of particular
areas of Israeli private law. He has studied and analyzed the institutional roles
appropriate to rights-protecting democracies, as well as the framing provided by
international law, all from a transnational perspective.
As noted, President Barak published widely in Israel and abroad while still an
active judge. He produced three monographs in English entitled Judicial Discretion, The
Judge in a Democracy and Purposive Interpretation in Law. 76 In his masterful article in
the HarvardLaw Review, Foreword:A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court
in a Democracy," he provides an integrated model of public law fully informed by his
comparative perspective.7 7 More recently, since his retirement, he has returned to a life
of teaching and writing. His latest book Proportionality:ConstitutionalRights and Their
Limitations, has just been published by Cambridge University Press. He is currently
writing a monograph on human dignity, the concept that underlies modern constitutional
rights-protection. A number of his leading judgments are available in English translation
on the website of the Supreme Court of Israel and more generally on the internet. 79
President Barak has studied American constitutional law, history, and theory in
great depth and at close quarters, having enjoyed extended and regular visits to many
leading U.S. law faculties. He has engaged in many of the debates within American
constitutional law, including the debate on transnational law now raging in academic,
judicial, and political circles. He strongly affirms the relevance of comparative and
international law to the adjudication of public law questions, rejecting the repudiation of
this type of intellectual openness in the U.S. academy and by a number of Supreme Court

76.

AHARON

BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY

(2006); AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION

(Yadin Kaufman trans., 1989); AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW (Sari Bashi, trans.,
2005) [hereinafter PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION].

77. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of A Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116
HARv. L. REv. 19 (2002-2003) [hereinafter Foreivord].
78.

AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012).

79. See generally OFFICIAL ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WEBSITE, http://www.court.gov.il (last visited Mar. 18,
2012)
(in
Hebrew);
THE
STATE
OF
ISRAEL,
THE
JUDICIAL
AUTHORITY,
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2012); ISRAELI LAW RESOURCE CENTER,

http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
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justices. 80 His high stature in U.S. legal academic circles may have prompted Bork and
Posner to make him an example of the dangers ofjudicial reference to transnational legal
material.
President Barak's approach to constitutional adjudication builds on a general
theory of constitutional law applicable to all rights-protecting constitutional democracies.
It applies to constitutions based on the common law, the civil law, or some combination
of the two. 8 1 It applies regardless of the form that a constitution takes - whether fully or
partly written; whether imbued with the status of supreme or higher law; whether old or
new; and whether reviewed by a Supreme or Constitutional Court. He regards the
judiciary as the guardian of the constitutional order and, in particular, of the rightsprotecting, democratic governance that modern constitutionalism mandates. 82
Within this theory, the judiciary and the legislatures are both law-making bodies.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the constitutional authority of the judiciary
has been enlarged, not at the expense of the democratic function, but to protect its
vibrancy. Judicial review protects the democratic function, the rule of law, the separation
of powers, the independence of the judiciary, and constitutional rights.83 Unlike the
legislature, the judiciary performs its law-making function interstitially in the context of
litigated cases.84 The particular responsibilities of the judiciary are daunting: to facilitate
change within a stable structure by "maintain[ing] normative coherence" and fidelity to
fundamental values. 85
The judiciary performs this function with attentiveness to the history of the
twentieth century, in which the fragility of democracy and the horrific pain and suffering
inflicted by despotic, racist, and genocidal governance were fully demonstrated.86 The
constitutional lessons drawn from that history are both institutional and substantive.
Judicial review of the exercise of public authority, including review of legislation, has a
paramount normative function: it ensures the rule of law, the stability of the
constitutional order and access to justice against those who would privilege private
power based on wealth, traditional elites, and social hierarchies. This model therefore
affords generous rules of standing and justiciability.
Substantively, it respects and

80. See BARAK, supra note 78. See generally RICHARD POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008); Benjamin

Soskis, Judging Aharon, THE JEWISH DAILY FORWARD, (July 13, 2007) http://www.forward.com/articles/
11114/;
Global Constitutionalism Seminar, YALE
LAW
SCHOOL,
http://www.law.yale.edu/
intellectuallife/globalconstitutionalismseminar.htm (last visited March 9, 2012).
81. Foreiward,supranote 77, at 25.
82. Id. at 36.
83. Id. at 38. President Barak's delineation of democracy includes constitutionalism, legislative supremacy
under the constitution, fundamental principles, and human rights. Id at 38-46.
84. Id. at 32. In regards to the common law, the judiciary is the primary lawmaker, while in the legislation,
the judge is the faithful interpreter. Id. at 29.
85. Id. at 29-36.
86. Id. at 20-21.
87. In regards to standing, see id. at 106-10. In regards tojudiciability, see id. at 97-106. The standing of
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to challenge the actions of the Israeli military as the occupying
administration is exemplified in HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Israel [2004], available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/39a82e2ca42b52974125673e00508144/09d47365bd007706cl2575c20046ec2
a!OpenDocument. Both Bork and Posner reject this expansive view of standing. See Harzewski v. Guidant
Corp., 489 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2007) (warning against interpreting the standing requirements too broadly);
Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1174-85 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring).
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protects individual freedom and equality, not merely as a national set of historically
crystallized priorities, but in association with the postwar international rights-protecting
instruments. 8 8
The written constitution erects a normative umbrella for the whole legal system,
shaping "the character of society and its aspirations throughout history."89 The
constitution establishes the framework for the democratic system and for governance on
the basis of philosophy, politics, society, and law. 90 Its text is only "the tip of the
iceberg.", however. 9 1
The language of the constitution is both abstract and general for a number of
reasons. It must reflect the negotiated compromises necessary for its adoption, the
affirmation of the particular nation's fundamental values, covenants and social
viewpoints, and the generality appropriate to an instrument designed to frame human
behavior and governance for an unknown future.92 In addition to its express formulation,
this language implies constitutional principles of great importance and complexity, such
as the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, and respect for human
rights. The interpreter's task is to extract the "legal meaning" from the "linguistic
meaning," a rational process that produces legal norms.93
This normative foundation, reflecting historical understandings and shaped by
contemporary values, frames the interpretive and analytic methodology for judicial
review. Judges must not impose their own preferences in the guise of interpretation.94
They do their interpretive work within the boundaries of the linguistic meaning of the
text, attentive to the appropriate levels of generality and abstraction. 95 This model denies
exclusivity and pre-emptive priority to historical readings of constitutional text.96 Judges
are not to limit their review to historical meaning or intent, either subjectively
understood at the time of its drafting or ratification or in regard to questions that might
later come to the judiciary for resolution in an unknown and unknowable future. 9 7 The
future grows out of the past but it is not enslaved to it. 98
The judiciary's interpretive engagement is purposive (or teleological), tied to the
deeply held normative values of constitutionalism. One level of inquiry focuses on
subjective purposes, which relate to the founders' contribution, the "goals, interests,
values, aims, policies, and function" that they "sought to actualize." 99 The attitude to the
founders' intentions relates to abstract concerns, not to the concrete legal arrangements
in place in their historical moment. There is no assumption that the founders meant to

88. BARAK, supra note 78, at 37.
89. PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 76, at 370.

90. Id.
91. Aharon Barak, Judicial Perspectives: The View from Israel, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASES OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES 287 (Shlomo Slonim, ed., 1990).
92. PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 76, at 372-73.

93. Foreivard,supra note 77, at 64.
94. Id. at 73.
95. Id. at 68.
96. PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 76, at 376.

97. Id. at 375.
98. Foreivard,supra note 77, at 70.
99. PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 76, at 375.
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petrify their legal, social or political universe. On the contrary, the constitutional system
leaves room for and embraces change; to some extent, it mandates change. In stipulating
these interpretive directives, Barak situates his constitutional theory and interpretive
methodology within the living constitution paradigm.
Barak characterizes U.S. academic and judicial preoccupation with originalism as
both exceptional and regrettable. 10 0 He supports this proposition by reference to
statements by justices in other constitutional democracies, which reject subjective
original intent and meaning as the exclusive or dominant interpretive methodology and
embrace instead the living constitutional paradigm and its interpretive methods. The
national constitutional systems referred to are the Canadian, Australian and German. To
the extent that he refers to U.S. Supreme Court justices and judgments favourably, his
references are usually to the Warren Court, which he understands to be prototypical of
the judicial role within rights-protecting democracy. lo
The judiciary's purposive methodology extends to examination of objective
purpose, which relates to the aspirations of the entire constitutional instrument, with
attention to the relationship between the whole and its parts. Added constitutional
instruments or amendments may thus have the effect of altering the meaning of the
earlier text to avoid internal contradiction.102 As noted, objective interpretation is the
primary mode of constitutional interpretation, especially in regard to older constitutional
instruments. 103

President Barak encapsulates his approach to constitutional interpretation in these
words:
Purposive interpretation of the constitution is based on the status
of the judge as an interpreter of the constitution. A judge who
interprets the constitution is a partner to the authors of the constitution.
The authors establish the text; the judge determines its [legal] meaning.
The authors formulate a will that they wish to realize; the judge locates
this will within the larger picture of the constitution's role in modern
life. The judge must ensure the continuity of the constitution. He or she
must strike a balance between the will of the authors of the constitution
and the fundamental values of those living under it.104
President Barak's rejection of originalist readings of the constitutional text leaves
room for consideration of transnational law. He finds the case law and academic
literature in constitutional democracies that embrace the same normative foundations
illuminating, but not authoritative. He rejects importation of alien or foreign elements

100. Foreward,supra note 77, at 72. ("... If one succeeds, as do the originalists, in escaping the heavy hand
of the subjective will [of the framers], why become entrenched in the historical past rather than turning an eye
towards contemporary needs? Why not take account of the fundamental modern principles that encompass the
Constitution?").
101. PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 76, at 385-86.
102. Id. at 378-79.
103. Foreivard,supra note 77, at 70-71.
104. Id. at 73-74.
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into the domestic constitution. Rather, transnational engagement provides deeper insights
and self-knowledge, revealing possibilities that otherwise lie hidden within one's own
legal system. So too, it heightens one's awareness of the distinctiveness of other
systems. 105 Like an "experienced friend," it provides guidance about successes and
failures elsewhere. The solution to each constitutional question is and must be "local,"
but it is enriched by consideration of the possible "arguments, legal trends, and decision1 06
making structures available."
While comparative constitutional engagement offers "expanded horizons and
cross-fertilization of ideas," the judiciary must be on guard lest an alien historical or
social element renders a particular insight inappropriate. Influence is greatest when
earlier constitutional texts influence later ones or where there is a strong commitment to
the same constitutional principles, such as democracy and human rights. International
conventions and the decisions of international and national courts that interpret these
conventions can provide direction given the similarity in their subject matter to that of
national constitutions. 107
President Barak notes with irony that the United States Supreme Court stands apart
from this engagement in comparative constitutional law even though many democratic
countries have been influenced by the American Constitution and its interpretation. U.S
Supreme Court justices thus "fail to make use of an important source of inspiration, one
that enriches legal thinking, makes law more creative, and strengthens the democratic
ties and foundations of different legal systems." He offers a mild admonition: "wise
parents do not hesitate to learn from their children." 108
This theoretical approach to transnational law is exemplified in President Barak's
judicial methodology, not necessarily in the results of cases. His cites as his favoured
comparators the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms, 1982 and the German Basic
Law, 1949. His methodology stipulates two stages of adjudication. The first addresses
the scope of the right, based on purposive or teleological interpretation, and the fact of its
infringement, while the second addresses the possible justification of any infringement.
The onus of argument and evidence in the first stage is carried by the rights-claimant; the
onus then shifts to the state in the second. The second stage encompasses the
instrumental and substantive rationality review so well described by Fiss.
President Barak has made a significant contribution to the development of modern
constitutional thinking and practice. He stands in the line of great judges who have
transformed the political theories of the Enlightenment into modern constitutional
precepts, institutions and institutional practice. This work has taken place in the
aftermath of the Second World War, when democratic nations considered it imperative to
establish and secure rights-protecting democratic governance at home as well as in the
defeated and failed states. One of the most basic features of this postwar constitutional
paradigm is the understanding of constitutionalism as a living tradition that melds respect
for equal and inherent human dignity with governance under representative and

105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at
Id at
Id. at
Id. at

110-11.
111.
112-13.
114 (citingUnited States v Then, 56 F. 3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, concurring)).
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accountable institutions. The next section situates President Barak's thinking within this
constitutional paradigm.
V. THE POST-WORLD WAR II CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM

The Second World War ushered in an intense period of constitutional construction
and reconstruction marking the juridical response to totalitarian, racist, imperialist
governance and World War. This project extended beyond the defeated states to shine
light upon the dirty corners of oppression and discrimination within established
democracies. It had become clear that majoritarian rule, while an admirable achievement
in contrast to totalitarian oppression, did not provide adequate realization of the
constitutional principles generated by the Enlightenment. The missing element was
identified as judicially enforced fundamental rights and freedoms, based on respect for
the equal and inherent dignity of the human person, at the national and supra-national
level.
The fall of relatively enlightened states into totalitarian oppression demonstrated
that majoritarian processes and party politics can work to undermine the principles that
legitimate the democratic function - especially the primacy of the individual
encapsulated in the idea of one person, one vote. Moreover, real, perceived and
manufactured emergency can induce legislators to set aside their duty to protect and
respect equal and inherent human dignity. Even in relatively stable periods, rational
deliberation and consensus building can be held hostage to historically privileged values
or to the privilege of social, political and wealthy elites. So too, constitutional
stipulations for equal treatment under the law can succumb to the ill will, ignorance or
expedience of elected officials who do not consider themselves bound to attend to the
needs or desires of minorities (including the vulnerable within minority communities),
the disadvantaged, or those who simply cherish increased pluralism and diversity.
Within the postwar constitutional paradigm, judicially enforced rights-protecting
instruments have the status of supreme or higher law in order to eradicate these
democratic deficits. These instruments require the state to respect, and in some cases
actively protect, the equal and inherent human dignity of all persons subject to its
authority. These entitlements are not the gift of the state. Rather, they are conceived as
preconditions of its legitimacy. Representative and accountable institutions deliberate
upon and enact legislation that embodies public preferences, on the condition that the
validity of those laws depends on their conformity to the principles embodied in the
fundamental rights and freedoms. Independent, expert, politically detached and
intellectually engaged judges scrutinize the content and impact of law and state action for
conformity. The non-majoritarian and non-democratic character ofjudicial review makes
possible its institutional and substantive rationality, which legitimates public law.
This post-WWII conceptualization of the constitutional state is predicated upon an
organic understanding of the constitutional order. Abstract principles are conceived as
looking backward and forward in time. They are remedial in that they correct or prevent
repetition of past failures of major and minor proportions, some domestic and some
foreign. They are transformative in that they cast their normative framing into the
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unknowable future. Judicial review provides a bridge from past failings to deeper fidelity
to this normative framing. On this basis, access to the courts is necessary and generous,
affording both private and public interest standing. Expert and representative interveners
participate by providing argumentation and, in some instances, contributing expert
opinion and social science data to the factual record. Parties and interveners introduce
relevant comparative constitutional reference material. Concrete and abstract questions
are justiciable, including issues of the highest political import. The rule of law
encompasses the rule of constitutional law in the broadest sense.
Constitutionally protected rights and freedoms make up a coherent unity,
elaborated case by case, slowly correcting prior failings by applying fundamental
principles to novel questions. The full extent of the substantive principles engaged is not
exhausted by the social, historical or textual encapsulation of specific constitutional
formulations. It is also not reflected in the idea of absolute, concrete rights or freedoms
frozen in time. Courts read the rights to perpetuate their fundamental content in
application to a changing world. Courts also evaluate the state's claims that its
encroachments on rights and freedoms are justified in order to realize the fullest
enjoyment of the underlying principles.
These principles determine that the amplitude and application of each of the
guaranteed rights must accommodate all other guarantees and pre-eminent constitutional
principles as well as other considerations that from time to time rise to the stature of
constitutional concern, such as the exigencies of emergency conditions that threaten
constitutional governance or the existence of the constitutional state.
This structure of rights protection combines purposive interpretation of the
constitutional text with proportionality analysis of all tentative findings of infringement
of protected rights and freedoms.
Purposive interpretation articulates the principles inherent in the specifically
guaranteed rights and freedoms as abstractions that enjoy priority over linguistic
evaluation, historical origins and meaning, national understandings and traditional or
faith-based mores, and considerations of utility or efficiency. Theoretical, historical and
transnational perspectives illuminate national ways of thinking and values in both
positive and negative ways. When the values and principles engaged optimize the equal
enjoyment of human rights, there is less room for national variations. The intellectual
engagement is not bound by specific cultural, traditional, positivist, or national
considerations. Rationality displaces culture war, because this approach entails not
merely a living constitutional ethos, but also an intellectually open engagement.
Purposive analysis requires judicial analysis of argument and factual material
based on the history and theory of constitutional and human rights as well as developing
trends in other rights-protecting democracies and within international human rights law.
This mode of analysis requires judicial analysis of argument and factual material
submitted by the state to satisfy its onus to justify the curtailment of any particular right.
On this basis, the judiciary applies a sequenced set of rigorous tests, not to impose
personal or political preferences, but to ensure that the state acts in conformity to its
constitutional duties.
The shift in onus to the state to justify a prima facie infringement of a guaranteed
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right is enormously important. For example, when there is only one stage of
argumentation, it is respectable for the state to argue that equality does not extend to
same sex couples on the basis of textual analysis, legal history, tradition or faith based
considerations - or differences in social relations and family formation under legal
systems that criminalized certain sexual acts or discriminated against sexual minorities.
This approach leaves the extension of equality to the vulnerable, politically powerless,
and disadvantaged to the legislatures or constitutional amendment.
Proportionality methodology imposes an entirely different legal burden on the state
to justify, not merely to describe, assert, or explain. It is very difficult to justify
unequal treatment in regard to family and spousal status given current social science,
medical understandings, and societal developments "in a court of law." The justificatory
burden reflects the fact that the court has recognized a prima facia breach of a
constitutionally protected fundamental right.
When the judiciary engages in purposive interpretation and proportionality
analysis it does not change the meaning of the constitutional text; nor do the members of
the judiciary impose their personal or political preferences. On the contrary, the shift in
onus that frames purposive interpretation and rational analysis ofjustification demands a
highly sophisticated mode of legal reasoning as well as an elaborate record of
adjudicative, legislative and social fact. Perhaps more importantly, the legal reasoning
required also excludes extraneous considerations. The U.S. judgments that have moved
towards equality for gays, lesbians and other sexual minorities reflect this two-stage,
rationality-infused methodology. 109
When these standards of rationality inform constitutional analysis, they eventually
come to permeate the law-making process and the exercise of all public authority under
law, including executive rule making and the application of rules. The stricture that any
breach of a right must be prescribed by law upholds the democratic function and the rule
of law at the expense of vague and arbitrary law making as well as arbitrary power. The
further strictures of instrumental and substantive justification require the state, if it is to
sustain the validity of the impugned law or state action, to demonstrate that it has carried
out its constitutional duties to protect rights. These duties require argument, evidence,
expertise, and/or social science to demonstrate the instrumental and substantive
rationality of the impugned exercise of public authority.
It has taken decades for this constitutional paradigm to mature. One of its strongest
manifestations developed as the distinctive adjudicative model of the Warren Court,
which treated the U.S. Constitution as a unified, codified whole; brought to life the longneglected amendments adopted after the Civil War; and invoked equal and inherent
human dignity to abandon racial discrimination, the subordination of women to nature,
faith and culture, and the disrespect within criminal and administrative law of the
primacy of the individual.
Roe v. Wade and Lawrence v Texas, the culture war cases that the originalists
repudiate most vehemently, are strong examples of the post-WWII constitutional

109. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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paradigm.11 0 The statements in the Warren Court case law pointed out for ridicule most
frequently by the originalists are clear statements of various strands of this model, which
has become the scaffolding of constitutionalism in many national and supra-national
rights-protecting settings.
It is regrettable that U.S. academics and justices who read the American
Constitution as a holistic document committed to fundamental constitutional principles
have so little connection to the constitutional ideas and practices developing in other
jurisdictions more congenial to their way of thinking - ideas and practices directly
connected to a widely respected, normatively inspired, and institutionally innovative
period in U.S. constitutional history. The concluding section of this paper looks forward
to a more open attitude to transnational legal resources.
VI. ORIGINALISM, TRANSNATIONALISM, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Robert Bork and Richard Posner have good reason to express concern about the
appeal of the work of sophisticated and well-educated foreign justices who introduce
influential Americans, including future judicial appointees, to the postwar model of
constitutionalism and direct them to its elaboration of the ideas of the founding
generation, those who framed the post-Civil War amendments, and the work of the
Warren Court.
Casual references by Supreme Court justices to rights-protecting rulings in foreign
courts have triggered strenuous objection. But, to borrow President Barak's imagery,
these references are merely the tip of the transnational legal iceberg. Transnational
resources offer American judges, academics, and even politicians, a full juridical
paradigm upon which to rebuild their understanding of U.S. constitutional law, theory,
and judicial methodology as a living, historically-informed, and textually based
constitutional framework, committed to the equal and inherent dignity of all members of
American society.
Those who champion originalism often say that their paradigm prevails over the
living constitution paradigm because they have a theory and their interloquiters do not.
The study of comparative constitutional law and international human rights law
demonstrates that they do not have a theory. Rather, they have a construction of
assumptions and a clunky, result oriented mode of legal argumentation.
Moreover, this study reveals a constitutional paradigm embedded in U.S.
constitutional history, the work of the Warren Court, and, in particular, cases such as Roe
and Lawrence. This paradigm consists of a developed, sophisticated and institutionally
legitimate mode of constitutional engagement that flourishes as the foundation of modern
constitutionalism and does so to a considerable extent as a U.S. export. This
constitutional paradigm delivers what the originalists cannot an objective,

110. For analysis of Roe v Wade and another less obvious example, Lochner, see Lorraine E. Weinrib, The
PostaiarParadigmand American Exceptionalism", in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS, 84 (Sujit

Choudhry ed., 2006). For analysis of this dynamic in the U.S. death penalty cases, see Lorraine E. Weinrib,
Constitutional Conceptions, Constitutional Comparativism, in Defining the Field of Comparative
Constitutional Law, 3 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002).
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institutionally legitimate role for the courts based on an analytic methodology that
infuses the exercise of public power with fundamental norms as well as both
instrumental and substantive rationality.
Given the shared commitment to the substantive foundations of living
constitutionalism, it makes sense for modern constitutional democracies to learn from
each other when drafting, interpreting and developing constitutional law. This
intellectual engagement does not erase the differences between constitutional
arrangements or aspirations in different nation states. It acknowledges shared normative
commitments. There is no question of alien importation, borrowing or migration. The
legal paradigm of the modern constitutional state reflects ideas that are larger than the
history of any particular nation or the words of any legal text. This paradigm is the
progenitor of the modem constitutional state, not its product.
Current academic literature on constitutional interpretation in the United States
indicates strong interest in revisiting the monopoly on history and text arrogated by the
originalists. II These efforts focus critical attention upon the failings of the originalist
enterprise. This critique would be strengthened by including transnational perspectives,
which provide theoretical framing, institutional structure and legal methodology. These
resources can illuminate the relevant history from a fresh perspective - the neglected
heritage of British constitutionalism as well as the Enlightenment roots that all modern
rights-based constitutions share. This history grounded the signature features of the
Warren Court's work. This perspective does not eliminate history and text from the
debate, as the originalists claim. Rather, it situates legal analysis within an enlarged
understanding of the relevant history and text.
As President Barak has so eloquently stated, transnational legal resources offer the
comfort and guidance of an experienced friend. Chief Justice Roberts, aligning with the
attitudes of Bork and Posner, invokes the same metaphor. He equates judicial selection
of comparators with picking out friends in a crowd, i.e., to affirm one's own established
preferences.112 President Barak's work, as well as that of other great constitutional
judges of his and earlier generations, is far from arbitrary, however. It is true that there
are legal systems that permit the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles and the
mentally retarded, restrict access to abortion based on retrograde ideas about women's
sexuality, criminalize adult consensual homosexual acts and/or deny sexual minorities
the basic opportunities in life, and undermine the integrity of the democratic electoral
system. But, in what way are they America's friends? Chief Justice Robert's example
reflects the poverty of the idea that transnational legal engagement involves finding and
counting up countries with similar laws. The ideal of a petrified constitution has failed to
provide the vibrant democratic engagement and judicial impartiality promised. It has
drawn a distorted and misleading picture of the legitimate ways in which judges,
academics and opinion leaders learn from other rights-protecting democracies. It denies
what transnational legal resources confirm - that it is possible to conceive a judicial
role in protecting rights that reflects the best understandings of the separation of powers,
I11. See supra note 9.
112. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to be the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,109"' Cong. (2005).
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the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and democratic governance. It also
undermines the leadership role that the United States should have in the development of
a transnational constitutional paradigm that is one of the greatest exemplars of American
j urisprudential genius.
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